rfc9874v1.txt   rfc9874.txt 
Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF) S. Hollenbeck Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF) S. Hollenbeck
Request for Comments: 9874 Verisign Labs Request for Comments: 9874 W. Carroll
BCP: 244 W. Carroll BCP: 244 Verisign Labs
Category: Best Current Practice Verisign Category: Best Current Practice G. Akiwate
ISSN: 2070-1721 G. Akiwate ISSN: 2070-1721 Stanford University
Stanford University
September 2025 September 2025
Best Practices for Deletion of Domain and Host Objects in the Extensible Best Practices for Deletion of Domain and Host Objects in the Extensible
Provisioning Protocol (EPP) Provisioning Protocol (EPP)
Abstract Abstract
The Extensible Provisioning Protocol (EPP) includes commands for The Extensible Provisioning Protocol (EPP) includes commands for
clients to delete domain and host objects, both of which are used to clients to delete domain and host objects, both of which are used to
publish information in the Domain Name System (DNS). EPP also publish information in the Domain Name System (DNS). EPP also
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3.3. Relational Consistency Considerations 3.3. Relational Consistency Considerations
4. Host Object Renaming Risk 4. Host Object Renaming Risk
5. Analysis of Practices for Domain and Host Object Deletion 5. Analysis of Practices for Domain and Host Object Deletion
5.1. Renaming to Sacrificial Hosts 5.1. Renaming to Sacrificial Hosts
5.1.1. Practice Benefits 5.1.1. Practice Benefits
5.1.2. Practice Detriments 5.1.2. Practice Detriments
5.1.3. Observed Practices for Renaming to Sacrificial Hosts 5.1.3. Observed Practices for Renaming to Sacrificial Hosts
5.1.3.1. Renaming to External, Presumed Non-Existent Hosts 5.1.3.1. Renaming to External, Presumed Non-Existent Hosts
5.1.3.1.1. Practice Benefits 5.1.3.1.1. Practice Benefits
5.1.3.1.2. Practice Detriments 5.1.3.1.2. Practice Detriments
5.1.3.2. Renaming to "as112.arpa" 5.1.3.2. Renaming to "AS112.ARPA"
5.1.3.2.1. Practice Benefits 5.1.3.2.1. Practice Benefits
5.1.3.2.2. Practice Detriments 5.1.3.2.2. Practice Detriments
5.1.3.3. Renaming to Non-Authoritative Hosts 5.1.3.3. Renaming to Non-Authoritative Hosts
5.1.3.3.1. Practice Benefits 5.1.3.3.1. Practice Benefits
5.1.3.3.2. Practice Detriments 5.1.3.3.2. Practice Detriments
5.1.3.4. Renaming to Client-Maintained Dedicated Sacrificial 5.1.3.4. Renaming to Client-Maintained Dedicated Sacrificial
Name Server Host Objects Name Server Host Objects
5.1.3.4.1. Practice Benefits 5.1.3.4.1. Practice Benefits
5.1.3.4.2. Practice Detriments 5.1.3.4.2. Practice Detriments
5.1.4. Potential Practices for Renaming to Sacrificial Hosts 5.1.4. Potential Practices for Renaming to Sacrificial Hosts
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not assigned to an account, then a malicious actor may add the domain not assigned to an account, then a malicious actor may add the domain
to a service account and gain control of (i.e., hijack) DNS to a service account and gain control of (i.e., hijack) DNS
resolution functionality. If the new external host offers recursive resolution functionality. If the new external host offers recursive
DNS service or no DNS service, then DNS requests for the domain will DNS service or no DNS service, then DNS requests for the domain will
result in SERVFAIL messages or other errors. Aggressive requeries by result in SERVFAIL messages or other errors. Aggressive requeries by
DNS resolvers may then create large numbers of spurious DNS queries DNS resolvers may then create large numbers of spurious DNS queries
for an unresolvable domain. Note that renaming a host object to a for an unresolvable domain. Note that renaming a host object to a
name of an external host cannot be reversed by the EPP client. name of an external host cannot be reversed by the EPP client.
This document describes the rationale for the "SHOULD NOT be deleted" This document describes the rationale for the "SHOULD NOT be deleted"
text and the risk associated with host object renaming. Section 5 text in [RFC5731] and [RFC5732] as well as the risk associated with
includes a detailed analysis of the practices that have been and can host object renaming. Section 5 includes a detailed analysis of the
be used to mitigate that risk. Section 6 includes specific practices that have been and can be used to mitigate that risk.
recommendations for the best practices. Section 6 includes specific recommendations for the best practices.
2. Conventions Used in This Document 2. Conventions Used in This Document
The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
"SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and
"OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in
BCP 14 [RFC2119] [RFC8174] when, and only when, they appear in all BCP 14 [RFC2119] [RFC8174] when, and only when, they appear in all
capitals, as shown here. capitals, as shown here.
3. Rationale for "SHOULD NOT be deleted" 3. Rationale for "SHOULD NOT be deleted"
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inconsistency condition in which the EPP client and the EPP server inconsistency condition in which the EPP client and the EPP server
have different views of what remains registered after processing a have different views of what remains registered after processing a
<delete> command. The text in [RFC5731] and [RFC5732] was written to <delete> command. The text in [RFC5731] and [RFC5732] was written to
encourage clients to take singular, discrete steps to delete objects encourage clients to take singular, discrete steps to delete objects
in a way that maintains client-server data consistency. Experience in a way that maintains client-server data consistency. Experience
suggests that this inconsistency poses little operational risk. suggests that this inconsistency poses little operational risk.
3.3. Relational Consistency Considerations 3.3. Relational Consistency Considerations
Implementations of EPP can have dependencies on the hierarchical Implementations of EPP can have dependencies on the hierarchical
domain object / host object relationship, as can exist in a domain object / host object relationship, which can exist in a
relational database. In such instances, deletion of a domain object relational database. In such instances, deletion of a domain object
without addressing the existing subordinate host objects can cause without addressing the existing subordinate host objects can cause
relational consistency and integrity issues. The text in [RFC5731] relational consistency and integrity issues. The text in [RFC5731]
and [RFC5732] was written to reduce the risk of these issues arising and [RFC5732] was written to reduce the risk of these issues arising
as a result of implicit object deletion. as a result of implicit object deletion.
4. Host Object Renaming Risk 4. Host Object Renaming Risk
As described in [RFC5731], it is possible to delete a domain object As described in [RFC5731], it is possible to delete a domain object
that has associated host objects that are managed by other clients by that has associated host objects that are managed by other clients by
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risk of DNS resolution hijacking if someone were to register the risk of DNS resolution hijacking if someone were to register the
"example.org" domain and create a subordinate host object named "example.org" domain and create a subordinate host object named
"ns1.example.org". That name server would receive DNS queries for "ns1.example.org". That name server would receive DNS queries for
all domains delegated to it, allowing the operator of the name server all domains delegated to it, allowing the operator of the name server
to respond in potentially malicious ways. to respond in potentially malicious ways.
5. Analysis of Practices for Domain and Host Object Deletion 5. Analysis of Practices for Domain and Host Object Deletion
EPP servers can employ a range of practices for domain and host EPP servers can employ a range of practices for domain and host
object deletion. Notably, the scope of any practice discussed here object deletion. Notably, the scope of any practice discussed here
is the EPP server that adopts the practice and the domains managed by is the EPP server that adopts the practice, the domains managed by
it. The practices described in this document fall into two broad it, and the associated host objects where "associated" is described
categories: renaming objects to use sacrificial hosts and allowing in [RFC5731] and [RFC5732]. The practices described in this document
objects to be deleted even if there are existing data relationships. fall into two broad categories: renaming objects to use sacrificial
These practice categories are described in the following sections. hosts and allowing objects to be deleted even if there are existing
For a broader consideration of practices and potential impacts on data relationships. These practice categories are described in the
registries and registrars, [SAC125] offers some complementary following sections. For a broader consideration of practices and
insight. potential impacts on registries and registrars, [SAC125] offers some
complementary insight.
5.1. Renaming to Sacrificial Hosts 5.1. Renaming to Sacrificial Hosts
Sacrificial hosts are hosts whose name is intended to remove an Sacrificial hosts are hosts whose name is intended to remove an
existing relationship between domain and host objects. To that end, existing relationship between domain and host objects. To that end,
sacrificial hosts are either renamed to an external host or sacrificial hosts are either renamed to an external host or
associated with a different domain object in the EPP server. The associated with a different domain object in the EPP server. The
first group of deletion practices use sacrificial hosts leveraging first group of deletion practices use sacrificial hosts leveraging
existing EPP server support for renaming host objects. existing EPP server support for renaming host objects.
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Malicious actors have registered these parent domains and created Malicious actors have registered these parent domains and created
child host objects to take control of DNS resolution for associated child host objects to take control of DNS resolution for associated
domains [Risky-BIZness]. domains [Risky-BIZness].
Sponsoring clients of the associated domains are not informed of the Sponsoring clients of the associated domains are not informed of the
change. Associated domains may no longer resolve if all their hosts change. Associated domains may no longer resolve if all their hosts
are renamed. Associated domains may still resolve if they continue are renamed. Associated domains may still resolve if they continue
to be associated with existent hosts; in which case, their partial to be associated with existent hosts; in which case, their partial
vulnerability to hijacking is more difficult to detect. vulnerability to hijacking is more difficult to detect.
5.1.3.2. Renaming to "as112.arpa" 5.1.3.2. Renaming to "AS112.ARPA"
Some domain registrars, acting as EPP clients, have renamed host Some domain registrars, acting as EPP clients, have renamed host
objects to subdomains of "as112.arpa" or "empty.as112.arpa" objects to subdomains of "AS112.ARPA" or "EMPTY.AS112.ARPA"
[Risky-BIZness-IRTF]. This practice has been observed in use. [Risky-BIZness-IRTF]. This practice has been observed in use.
5.1.3.2.1. Practice Benefits 5.1.3.2.1. Practice Benefits
The primary benefit is convenience for the deleting EPP client. The The primary benefit is convenience for the deleting EPP client. The
deleting EPP client is not required to maintain an authoritative DNS deleting EPP client is not required to maintain an authoritative DNS
service or receive traffic. service or receive traffic.
5.1.3.2.2. Practice Detriments 5.1.3.2.2. Practice Detriments
This is a misuse of AS112, which is for reverse lookups on non-unique This is a misuse of AS112, which is for reverse lookups on non-unique
IPs, primarily so local admins can sinkhole non-global traffic IPs, primarily so local admins can sinkhole non-global traffic
[RFC7535]. "empty.as112.arpa" is designed to be used with DNAME [RFC7535]. "EMPTY.AS112.ARPA" is designed to be used with DNAME
aliasing, not as a parent domain for sacrificial name servers (see aliasing, not as a parent domain for sacrificial name servers (see
Section 3 of [RFC7535]). Unexpected AS112 traffic has previously Section 3 of [RFC7535]). Unexpected AS112 traffic has previously
caused problems with intrusion detection systems and firewalls caused problems with intrusion detection systems and firewalls
[RFC6305]. Local administrators can potentially hijack requests. [RFC6305]. Local administrators can potentially hijack requests.
AS112 infrastructure must be maintained. AS112 infrastructure must be maintained.
5.1.3.3. Renaming to Non-Authoritative Hosts 5.1.3.3. Renaming to Non-Authoritative Hosts
Some domain registrars, acting as EPP clients, have maintained host Some domain registrars, acting as EPP clients, have maintained host
objects with glue records pointing to prominent public recursive DNS objects with glue records pointing to prominent public recursive DNS
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these names as special or treat them differently than other these names as special or treat them differently than other
allowed domain names. allowed domain names.
4. Caching name servers are not expected to recognize these names as 4. Caching name servers are not expected to recognize these names as
special or treat them differently than other allowed domain special or treat them differently than other allowed domain
names. names.
5. Authoritative name servers are not expected to recognize these 5. Authoritative name servers are not expected to recognize these
names as special or treat them differently than other allowed names as special or treat them differently than other allowed
domain names. Requests to the root for this domain would result domain names. Requests to the root for this domain would result
in an NXDOMAIN response [RFC8499]. in an NXDOMAIN response [RFC9499].
6. DNS server operators will treat this domain and its subdomains as 6. DNS server operators will treat this domain and its subdomains as
they would any other allowed names in the DNS. they would any other allowed names in the DNS.
7. DNS registries/registrars will not be able to register this 7. DNS registries/registrars will not be able to register this
domain and must deny requests to register it or its subdomains. domain and must deny requests to register it or its subdomains.
5.1.4.3.1. Practice Benefits 5.1.4.3.1. Practice Benefits
This option would offer clarity concerning the intentions of This option would offer clarity concerning the intentions of
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5.2.1.1.1. Practice Benefits 5.2.1.1.1. Practice Benefits
This is convenient for the deleting EPP client. The deleting EPP This is convenient for the deleting EPP client. The deleting EPP
client is not required to maintain an authoritative DNS service or client is not required to maintain an authoritative DNS service or
receive traffic. The associated domains are not vulnerable to receive traffic. The associated domains are not vulnerable to
hijacking. hijacking.
5.2.1.1.2. Practice Detriments 5.2.1.1.2. Practice Detriments
This could result in domains with no remaining name servers being This could result in domains with no name servers being removed from
removed from the zone or domains with only one remaining name server. the zone or domains with only one name server remaining in the zone.
Deletions could potentially affect large numbers of associated Deletions could potentially affect large numbers of associated
domains, placing strain on domain registries. domains, placing strain on domain registries.
5.2.1.2. Inform Affected Clients 5.2.1.2. Inform Affected Clients
The sponsoring clients of affected domain objects may also be The sponsoring clients of affected domain objects may also be
informed of the change (e.g., through the EPP Change Poll extension informed of the change (e.g., through the EPP Change Poll extension
[RFC8590]). This practice has been observed in use. [RFC8590]). This practice has been observed in use.
5.2.1.2.1. Practice Benefits 5.2.1.2.1. Practice Benefits
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5.2.2.1.1. Practice Benefits 5.2.2.1.1. Practice Benefits
Registries would not be required to unilaterally take responsibility Registries would not be required to unilaterally take responsibility
for deletion. The deleting EPP client is not required to maintain an for deletion. The deleting EPP client is not required to maintain an
authoritative DNS service or receive traffic. The associated domains authoritative DNS service or receive traffic. The associated domains
are not vulnerable to hijacking. are not vulnerable to hijacking.
5.2.2.1.2. Practice Detriments 5.2.2.1.2. Practice Detriments
This could result in domains with no remaining name servers being This could result in domains with no name servers being removed from
removed from the zone or domains with only one remaining name server. the zone or domains with only one name server remaining in the zone.
Deletions could potentially affect large numbers of associated Deletions could potentially affect large numbers of associated
domains, placing strain on domain registries. domains, placing strain on domain registries.
5.2.2.2. Provide Additional Deletion Details 5.2.2.2. Provide Additional Deletion Details
The EPP server may provide the deleting EPP client with additional The EPP server may provide the deleting EPP client with additional
details of the affected objects. The deleting EPP client may receive details of the affected objects. The deleting EPP client may receive
a response (e.g., using msg, reason, or msgQ elements of the EPP a response (e.g., using msg, reason, or msgQ elements of the EPP
response [RFC5730]) that deletion of the host object would affect response [RFC5730]) that deletion of the host object would affect
domain objects sponsored by another client and may receive details domain objects sponsored by another client and may receive details
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[RFC7535] Abley, J., Dickson, B., Kumari, W., and G. Michaelson, [RFC7535] Abley, J., Dickson, B., Kumari, W., and G. Michaelson,
"AS112 Redirection Using DNAME", RFC 7535, "AS112 Redirection Using DNAME", RFC 7535,
DOI 10.17487/RFC7535, May 2015, DOI 10.17487/RFC7535, May 2015,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7535>. <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7535>.
[RFC8023] Thomas, M., Mankin, A., and L. Zhang, "Report from the [RFC8023] Thomas, M., Mankin, A., and L. Zhang, "Report from the
Workshop and Prize on Root Causes and Mitigation of Name Workshop and Prize on Root Causes and Mitigation of Name
Collisions", RFC 8023, DOI 10.17487/RFC8023, November Collisions", RFC 8023, DOI 10.17487/RFC8023, November
2016, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8023>. 2016, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8023>.
[RFC8499] Hoffman, P., Sullivan, A., and K. Fujiwara, "DNS
Terminology", RFC 8499, DOI 10.17487/RFC8499, January
2019, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8499>.
[RFC8590] Gould, J. and K. Feher, "Change Poll Extension for the [RFC8590] Gould, J. and K. Feher, "Change Poll Extension for the
Extensible Provisioning Protocol (EPP)", RFC 8590, Extensible Provisioning Protocol (EPP)", RFC 8590,
DOI 10.17487/RFC8590, May 2019, DOI 10.17487/RFC8590, May 2019,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8590>. <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8590>.
[RFC9499] Hoffman, P. and K. Fujiwara, "DNS Terminology", BCP 219,
RFC 9499, DOI 10.17487/RFC9499, March 2024,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc9499>.
[RFC9520] Wessels, D., Carroll, W., and M. Thomas, "Negative Caching [RFC9520] Wessels, D., Carroll, W., and M. Thomas, "Negative Caching
of DNS Resolution Failures", RFC 9520, of DNS Resolution Failures", RFC 9520,
DOI 10.17487/RFC9520, December 2023, DOI 10.17487/RFC9520, December 2023,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc9520>. <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc9520>.
[Risky-BIZness] [Risky-BIZness]
Akiwate, G., Savage, S., Voelker, G., and K. Claffy, Akiwate, G., Savage, S., Voelker, G., and K. Claffy,
"Risky BIZness: Risks Derived from Registrar Name "Risky BIZness: Risks Derived from Registrar Name
Management", IMC '21: Proceedings of the 21st ACM Internet Management", IMC '21: Proceedings of the 21st ACM Internet
Measurement Conference, DOI 10.1145/3487552.3487816, Measurement Conference, DOI 10.1145/3487552.3487816,
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Scott Hollenbeck Scott Hollenbeck
Verisign Labs Verisign Labs
12061 Bluemont Way 12061 Bluemont Way
Reston, VA 20190 Reston, VA 20190
United States of America United States of America
Email: shollenbeck@verisign.com Email: shollenbeck@verisign.com
URI: https://www.verisignlabs.com/ URI: https://www.verisignlabs.com/
William Carroll William Carroll
Verisign Verisign Labs
12061 Bluemont Way 12061 Bluemont Way
Reston, VA 20190 Reston, VA 20190
United States of America United States of America
Phone: +1 703 948-3200 Phone: +1 703 948-3200
Email: wicarroll@verisign.com Email: wicarroll@verisign.com
URI: https://verisign.com URI: https://verisign.com
Gautam Akiwate Gautam Akiwate
Stanford University Stanford University
450 Jane Stanford Way 450 Jane Stanford Way
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